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Author Note 
Somewhere during my academic experience, I stumbled upon a quote from Alexander 
(1990; see also, Humphrey, 1976). The quote, as cited by Flinn, Geary and Ward (2005), 
was:  
“... humans had in some unique fashion become so ecologically dominant that they in 
effect became their own principal hostile force of nature, explicitly in regard to 
evolutionary changes in the human psyche and social behavior...the real challenge in 
the human environment throughout history that affected the evolution of the intellect 
was not climate, weather, food shortages, or parasites—not even predators. Rather, it 
was the necessity of dealing continually with our fellow humans in social 
circumstances that became ever more complex and unpredictable as the human line 
evolved. Social cleverness, especially through success in competition achieved by 
cooperation, becomes paramount...nothing would select more potently for increased 
social intelligence...than a within-species co-evolutionary arms race in which success 
depended on effectiveness in social competition.”  
At the time I was very much into evolutionary theory and tried to fit it into every 
piece of research I laid my hands on. This quote seemed to encompass many of the things I 
was learning throughout the classes about humans, what makes us so different from other 
species, and why we do what we do. Truth be told, evolutionary theory seems to be able to 
pierce through just about anything (Dennett, 1995, p. 521; cited by Sommers & Rosenberg, 
2003). Alexander (1990) and his comments, in the context of a class on the above-average 
effect and social comparison, presented a story from a distant past on why that effect came to 
be around and so consistently found in research of social psychologists. An ever more 
complex social competition laid out the conditions for effects like better-than-average to 
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appear, as this relentless battle with others and one’s own reality seems to call for, at least, 
the belief of being something more than one might actually be. 
In The Rebel, Albert Camus (1956) wrote: “Man is the only creature who refuses to be 
what he is.” It seems as if man is either cognitively wired or highly motivated to believe he is 
better than what he really is (i.e., to self-enhance) and to believe he is better than others. 
About this general fictitious reality that people seem to live in, Becker (1971; cited by 
Aarssen, 2018) stated:  
“The world of human aspiration is largely fictitious, and if we do not understand this, 
we understand nothing about man. …If you reveal the fictional nature of culture you deprive 
life of its heroic meaning because the only way one can function as a hero is within the 
symbolic fiction. If you strip away the fiction man is reduced to his basic physical 
existence—he becomes an animal like any other animal.” 
The fictitious nature of beliefs allows people to deal with the holes one might 
(forcefully) get to peek through from time to time. These holes reveal the unknown and the 
unknowable. But they also reveal the dark reality one is trying hard not to face. Both linger 
behind the curtains. Very much like blood coming out of an open wound must be properly 
taken care of, so too one’s own fictitious nature cares protection from those who tell us that 
our thoughts or beliefs do not fit what reality is. As if telling us this wound is not properly 
sealed. As if more blood was coming out, blood we do not wish to see. And, indeed, against 
the beliefs and rationalisms of others (like science), which question the veracity and validity 
of our own sealing materials and our ability to seal the wound, one must find a way to protect 
himself. For that, people simply perceive others’ scope of knowledge as limited, even if it is 
not the case, or dismiss what could be relevant information, when perceived as opposing 
theirs. 
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«We tend to resolve our perplexity arising out of the experience that other people see 
the world differently than we see it ourselves by declaring that those others, in 
consequence of some basic intellectual and moral defect, are unable to see the things 
“as they really are” and to react to them “in a normal way.” We thus imply, of course, 
that things are in fact as we see them and that our ways are the normal ways» 
(Ichheiser, 1949, p. 39; cited by Pronin, Gilovich & Ross, 2004). 
Note that with this collection of thoughts I am not trying to argue for the value of 
evolutionary theory. Nor is my objective to claim to have found the reason people share these 
above-average beliefs. I am simply trying to convey the point that there are many ways one 
might come about the conclusions that we so frequently get as the results of our scientific 
experiments. Many were the cases where the poetic or philosophical intuitions of some, non-
intently inspired others to investigate through the scientific methods those very possibilities. 
And there were many times where those very intuitions, as reduced to essence as they were, 
turned out not to be proven wrong. The same as happened the other way around. Even though 
sometimes those findings became intuitions that were not quite what science meant for them 
to be perceived as. Nonetheless, they were knowledge, and people were learning them. And 
what is the point of science if not, with time, to become fully intuitive for scientists, then no 
longer scientists, and for people? 
In the very first draft of this thesis, I wrote:  
“What seems to be a fairly intuitive thought comes to mind (…) From intuition vs. 
deliberation, hot cognition vs. cold cognition, mind vs. matter, irrational vs. rational, purpose 
vs. mechanism, even to motive vs. cognition and, still within Psychology, to id vs. super-ego 
or unconscious vs. conscious, it seems that this impulsive, somewhat spontaneous child-like 
entity naively navigating itself fearlessly filled with desire and curiosity goes hand to hand 
with this rule-based, thoughtful and serious looking character, very much like an experienced 
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father who seems to be highly aware of the other as it holds the ship just up to that one 
moment the first one, now older and wiser, is ready to go by its own, right back to Eden. That 
one moment that never comes.” 
With this, very cryptically, I was trying to draw the world behind and within the 
dilemma of what is exactly is the role of science, if not to become the father, leading us back 
to Eden. That very same place where every answer to any problem simply roles off the 
tongue, no more thinking, as all the thinking has been done, every problem has been solved. 
Eden is where father and son get together as one, where both sides of a duality are no longer 
opposites but one thing. Consciousness was the very thing that threw us out of Eden, 
ashamed, aware of our nakedness we cannot simply go back, the world is now divided in two 
– the good and the bad, the good in the good and the good in the bad, the bad in the good and 
the bad in the bad. As the world got divided in halves, so those halves got divided again, and 
it is our job to keep looking for where exactly is the middle of that one half we then proceed 
to slice, again and again. Maybe one day we will forget, we have been slicing forever. Or 
everything is so small, it will feel like whole again. This is, to me, the world science is 
embedded in. It will come a time where our sons have grown old, and we have grown old as 
well. Then, we must trust to have taught everything that our sons needed to them themselves 
become the father. Then, one must not to not let go of the seat. Destiny always comes, and 
like Oedipus, the son will always come for his father. To not let go of the sit, is to die in pain, 
to live in Hell. I hope for Science, a place in Heaven. 
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Resumo 
As pessoas têm teorias leigas sobre a mente e sobre como esta funciona (e.g., Dweck, 
1999), e também têm teorias sobre o que a ciência é capaz de explicar em relação a essa 
mesma mente (Fernandez-Duque, 2017; Gottlieb, 2018; Gottlieb & Lombrozo, 2017). 
Gottlieb e Lombrozo (2017) procuraram perceber quais eram as intuições que as 
pessoas tinham em relação ao potencial explicativo da ciência a respeito de vários fenómenos 
(e.g., amor romântico, moralidade, utilização de perceção e motricidade para alcançar 
objetos). Para isso, perguntaram sobre os vários fenómenos quanto é que as pessoas achavam 
que a ciência era capaz de explicá-los totalmente e quanto é que uma explicação científica 
geraria desconforto. Juntaram a isto uma exploração de potenciais moderadores que 
pudessem caracterizar os fenómenos como mais ou menos explicáveis e mais ou menos fora 
do domínio da ciência. Entre estes fatores estavam: acesso através da perspetiva de primeira-
pessoa, ou seja, que só a pessoa pudesse conhecer de facto a própria experiência; introspeção, 
ou seja, a pessoa poder conhecer a experiência através da consulta dos seus próprios 
pensamentos e das suas próprias emoções; tornar os humanos únicos e excecionais, ou seja, 
que ser capaz de uma certa faculdade mental é o que torna os humanos excecionais e que só 
eles têm essa habilidade; envolver controlo consciente, ou seja, que as pessoas têm vontade 
consciente sobre certo fenómeno e podem influenciar deliberadamente quando, como e 
porque é que certo fenómeno acontece. Os resultados indicaram que as explicações 
científicas são impossíveis e desconfortáveis quando um, ou vários, destes fatores 
caracterizam os fenómenos em causa. Isto até aconteceu para fenómenos que as pessoas não 
viveram e sobre os quais reconheciam que a sua imaginação não seria capaz de saber como 
era viver esses fenómenos (e.g., ser surdo e usar pela primeira vez um aparelho auditivo; 
Gottlieb, 2018), rejeitando a possibilidade de a ciência poder contribuir para compreender e 
decidir sobre viver ou não a experiência em causa, quando comparado com a própria 
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imaginação. Mais ainda, quando consideraram os testemunhos de outras pessoas, que tinham 
vivido os fenómenos em causa, como adequados para saber sobre as novas experiências, 
preferiram usar a sua própria imaginação na tomada de decisão sobre avançar ou não para o 
experimentar viver essas experiências. Como sugeriu a autora, pode ser o caso que as pessoas 
são resistentes à possibilidade de as experiências dos outros ou de as explicações científicas 
serem aplicáveis a si (Gottlieb, 2018), da mesma forma e na mesma medida em que poderão 
ser aplicáveis aos outros. 
De facto, as pessoas pensam nos outros como menos complexos (Schroeder, Waytz & 
Epley, 2017; Waytz, Schroeder & Epley, 2014) e parecem acreditar nisto em praticamente 
todos os domínios (e.g., Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Dunning, Heath & Suls, 2004; Williams & 
Gilovich, 2008). Condutores envolvidos em acidentes que os hospitalizaram acharam serem 
tão bons como condutores sem acidentes (Preston & Harris, 1965) e até presos acham serem 
melhores que outros presos e não-presos em vários aspetos do self (Sedikides, Meek, Alicke 
& Taylor 2014). Ou seja, homens que cometeram diversos crimes e condutores com registo 
de acidentes graves, acharam ser melhores que outros, mostrando ignorar as suas 
circunstâncias pessoais e a realidade que é estarem presos ou terem sido hospitalizados.  
Para além destes, outros estudos mostraram que as pessoas acreditam, por exemplo, 
que o seu passado e o seu futuro são mais imprevisíveis que o passado e o futuro dos outros, 
que o futuro delas tem mais caminhos possíveis e que o seu comportamento é, de forma 
única, guiado por intenções e desejos (Pronin & Kugler, 2010); ou que os outros são mais 
enviesados  (Kruger & Gilovich, 1999; Pronin, Lin & Ross, 2002). 
De particular importância, as pessoas acreditam que os estados internos dos outros são 
mais acessíveis que os seus (Pronin, Kruger, Savtisky & Ross, 2001). Quando estão a tentar 
fazer sentido de si mesmas e dos seus comportamentos, as pessoas valorizam muito a 
introspeção (Pronin, 2009), mas acham que a introspeção dos outros é um fator de 
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enviesamento. Mesmo que só uma ilusão (introspection illusion; ver Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977), a consideração pela própria introspeção é muito alta, especialmente para compreender 
o próprio e o complexo self que caracteriza a sua identidade. 
Posto isto, a previsão da investigação aqui apresentada é que as pessoas rejeitam a 
ideia que a ciência consiga explicar como é que elas pensam e o que é que sentem, quando os 
fenómenos em questão estão associados com um elevado potencial introspetivo. Porém, as 
pessoas devem estar mais dispostas a aceitar que a ciência explique melhor esses mesmo 
fenómenos quando estes se passam na mente dos outros, em comparação com dizerem 
respeito ao próprio. 
Os primeiros dois estudos forneceram testes correlacionais de vários potenciais 
moderadores desta diferença eu-outro: introspeção (de agora em diante, o fator a ter em 
conta), ser único, controlo consciente, e envolvimento (Gottlieb & Lombrozo, 2017). Os 
resultados foram os esperados: a diferença eu-outro emergiu moderada pelo fator introspeção. 
O terceiro estudo oferece evidência experimental direta sobre o efeito desse fator na diferença 
eu-outro.  
Assim, os resultados sugerem que as pessoas têm teorias diferentes sobre o que a 
ciência consegue explicar sobre si versus aquilo que a ciência consegue explicar sobre os 
outros. Para faculdades mentais fortemente associadas a introspeção, as pessoas acreditam 
que a ciência explica melhor os outros do que a si próprias. 
Algumas limitações são discutidas. Sobretudo, o Estudo 3 carece de algum rigor 
metodológico e são dadas algumas sugestões sobre como contornar alguns dos problemas, 
bem como complementar o trabalho realizado com outros estudos potencialmente relevantes 
para compreender mais profundamente o fenómeno. 
Na discussão, procurou-se integrar os resultados com algumas hipóteses clássicas em 
Psicologia Social. Primeiro, a hipótese do ator-observador sugere que, como ator, o foco da 
ix 
 
atenção está no conhecimento privado que o próprio tem sobre os seus desejos e as suas 
intenções em relação a aspetos situacionais aos quais a pessoa procura responder, enquanto 
que, como observador, o foco está no comportamento observável do ator, não tendo acesso a 
pistas privadas (Pronin, Gilovich & Ross, 2004). No entanto, esta hipótese não esclarece 
todas as dúvidas que existem quanto aos nossos resultados, bem como os dos outros trabalhos 
sobre diferenças eu-outro. Existe um longo debate na literatura destas diferenças entre a 
perspetiva motivacional e perspetiva não-motivacional (e.g. Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; 
Sherman & Sherman, 1999). A primeira sugere que os vieses comparativos estão ao serviço 
de objetivos relevantes para o próprio e outros motivos. A segunda sugere que os vieses 
comparativos são a consequência de características das tarefas e dos mecanismos cognitivos. 
Nesse sentido, são apresentadas brevemente as duas posições e discute-se a possibilidade de 
interação entre as duas formas de vieses. 
O trabalho termina com uma discussão das implicações práticas dos resultados, bem 
como da importância destes resultados para o papel da ciência e da comunicação científica.  
 
Palavras-chave: epistemologia leiga; teorias intuitivas; diferenças eu-outro; introspeção 
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Abstract 
Three studies show that people differ in their lay beliefs concerning the degree to which 
science can explain how their mind works versus how the mind of other people works. 
In particular, people are more receptive to the idea that the psychology of other people 
is explainable by science than to the possibility of science explaining their own 
psychology. This self-other difference is moderated by the degree to which people 
associate a certain mental phenomenon with introspection. 
 
Keywords: folk epistemology; intuitive theories; self-other differences; introspection 
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Science Can Explain Other People’s Minds, But Not Mine: 
Self-Other Differences in Beliefs about Science 
Introduction 
As a student of psychology, I understand now to have committed one of the most 
terrible sins a student of such crafts can commit: I took psychology into my household. As 
scientific evidences drooled out of my mouth to simply explain why my family was doing 
whatever it was doing, I was received with, what appeared to me at the time, a very defensive 
tone and an open rejection of the knowledge I well-intently was giving. That knowledge 
might very well serve others, but not them, they said. Only, when that knowledge proved to 
be congruent with their theories, a conversation about those very evidences was possible. I 
am now aware of the terrible mistake I made but became very intrigued as to what exactly 
went on upon their rejection.  
 
Lay Theories 
Before those events, I understood that the knowledge people have about the world is a 
compilation of thoughts that help them make sense of complex and ambiguous behaviors they 
face daily. These informal explanations can be called lay theories. Amongst these are theories 
about the mind and how it works (e.g., Dweck, 1999). There is evidence that people use their 
knowledge of situational pressures to make predictions about the behaviors of others (though 
not their own), showing some form of theory as to how it plays out in various contextual 
settings (Balcetis & Dunning, 2013). It has also been shown that those who believe that 
personal attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) and those who believe in fixed traits 
(entity theorists) differ in the way they make predictions about behavior, as well as the way 
they make trait inferences (Chiu, Hong & Dweck, 1997). Furthermore, people have lay 
theories of happiness (Furnham & Cheng, 2000), emotion (Labroo & Mukhopadhyay, 2009; 
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Ong, Zaki & Goodman, 2015; Tamir, John, Srivastava & Gross, 2007; Wilson & Gilbert, 
2003), suicide (Knight, Furnham & Lester, 2000), and the causes of alcoholism (Furnham & 
Lowick, 1984), among many others (see Furnham, 1988). 
 
The case of science. 
In addition to those many theories that people have about the mind and how it works, 
people also have certain intuitions about what science can and cannot explain about the mind 
(Fernandez-Duque, 2017; Gottlieb & Lombrozo, 2017; Lévy-Leboyer, 1988; Weisberg, Keil, 
Goodstein, Rawson & Gray, 2008).  
Regarding this, Gottlieb & Lombrozo (2017) wondered about the intuitive beliefs that 
people have concerning the limits of science in explaining the human mind. They asked, for 
several phenomenon (e.g., romantic love, morality, using perception and motricity to grab an 
object), how much people believed that science could fully explain them and how much a 
scientific explanation would generate discomfort. They also identified factors that 
characterize phenomena as “less explainable” and out of the scope of science. Among these 
were: first-person access, meaning that only the person can know exactly her own experience; 
introspection, meaning that the person can know her own experience through the examination 
of her own internal thoughts and feelings, making humans unique/exceptional, meaning that 
being able to do a certain phenomenon is what makes humans exceptional and that only they 
have that ability; conscious control, meaning that people have conscious will over said 
phenomenon and can deliberatively influence when, how, or why it happens. Their results 
were as expected: Scientific explanations are impossible and uncomfortable when one, some, 
or all those factors characterize the phenomena being judged. 
But the limits of science go beyond lived personal experience (Gottlieb, 2018). In 
fact, when people are deciding whether or not to go under new transformative (and non-
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transformative) experiences, there is evidence that they consider their imagination to be the 
most appropriate source of decision, over the testimony of others and scientific evidence. 
This happens despite people claiming that imagination was the worst way to know what new 
experiences would be like. To them, science was regarded as bad at knowing what new 
experiences would be like and equally poor as a source for decision on whether or not to 
engage in said experiences. These considerations were related to how much an experience 
was perceived as personally transformative. So, even when people know that they could not 
know what the consequences of undergoing such experiences will be, they prefer to rely on 
their own imagination than trusting science or others. 
In fact, even when the testimony of others was considered to be the best at knowing 
what a new experience would be like, people’s own imagination was still favored over the 
experiences of others when it came to the decision-making process. As said by the author, a 
possibility could be that people are resistant to the idea of others’ experiences or of scientific 
generalizations being applicable to them (for a more extended debate see Gottlieb, 2018), the 
same way those same generalizations might be applicable to others. 
 
Self-other Differences 
People tend to see others as less complex (Schroeder, Waytz & Epley, 2017; Waytz, 
Schroeder & Epley, 2014) than themselves, possibly making people more accepting of the 
possibility that science might explain others’ minds better than their own complex minds. 
There is a long and extensive literature in social psychology on the perceived 
differences between the self and others. It is generally shown that people see themselves as 
better than others in just about anything (e.g., Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Dunning, Heath & 
Suls, 2004; Williams & Gilovich, 2008). The thing is, not everyone can be better than most. 
That defeats the whole concept of average. Yet, most people believe to be better-than-
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average, putting themselves in a better light than others (intently or non-intently; the debate 
about motivated and non-motivated accounts of biases can be found in the General 
Discussion). 
Along the tradition of research on self-other differences it has been found that, for 
instance, people believe that others are more susceptible to persuasive tactics (Davison, 
1983), more motivated by extrinsic vs. intrinsic incentives (Heath, 1999), more conformist in 
domains ranging from consumer purchases to political views (Pronin, Berger & Molouki, 
2007), and less free (Helzer & Dunning, 2012; Pronin & Kugler, 2010). 
Pronin and Kugler (2010) showed that people believe their pasts and futures to be less 
predictable than others’ pasts and futures, that their future had more possible paths and that 
their own future behavior was uniquely driven by intentions and desires. And this last result 
has been somewhat shown before: people seem to believe that their intentions are important 
to make assessments about their own behavior but fail to find it equally important to make 
assessments about others (Pronin, 2008). 
People also think that other people are more biased than they are (Kruger & Gilovich, 
1999; Pronin, Lin & Ross, 2002). In Kruger and Gilovich’s (1999) study, whether 
participants were married couples, video game enthusiasts, debaters or dart players, they 
expected others to be biased when allocating responsibilities for a series of desirable and 
undesirable joint outcomes. And the same is true when comparing themselves to the average 
American, classmates in a seminar, and other airport travelers (Pronin et al., 2002). In this 
last study, their less biased status persisted even after reading a description on how they could 
have been affected by said bias, showing to dismiss information opposing their beliefs or to 
reject other’s opinions and theories about the workings of their minds. 
Another example of this could be, for example, people believing to be better drivers 
(Preston & Harris, 1965; Svenson, 1981). Preston and Harris (1965) compared drivers with 
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accident reports, whose driving involved them in accidents serious enough to require 
hospitalization, with drivers without accident reports. They were matched in sex, age, race, 
education level and not distinguishable on performances on written tests. Only the number of 
previous traffic violations separated them. The ones with accidents, when describing 
themselves on a driving performance continuum, rated themselves closer to the “expert” than 
the “very poor” level, similarly to the “safe” drivers. 
Even prisoners, when questioned about their moral and ethical characteristics, believe 
to be better than the average prisoner and even the average non-prisoner (Sedikides, Meek, 
Alicke & Taylor, 2014). Prisoners were asked to judge themselves on how, for example, 
moral, trustworthy, honest, generous, self-controlled and law-abiding they were compared to 
others. Even when comparing themselves to non-prisoners, they believed to be better than the 
average person, only believing otherwise with respect to a single trait: law-abidingness. This 
means that men who committed various crimes, independently of the severity of the crime, 
widely shared the belief of being better than the average person, dismissing their own 
personal circumstances and the palpable reality of being in prison or hospitalized by an 
accident. 
 
The case of introspection. 
As reviewed in the previous section, there are many ways in which others are seen as 
limited compared to us (e.g., Alicke, 1985; Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak & 
Vredenburg, 1995; Allison, Messick & Goethals, 1989; Dunning, Meyerowitz & Holzberg, 
1989; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar & Samuelson, 1985; for a review, e.g., Alicke & Govorun, 
2005). 
Part of those limitations might be what makes the testimonies of others to be less 
relevant than our own imagination during the decision-making process previously presented 
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(Gottlieb, 2018), or what makes people see science as incapable of explaining them on certain 
phenomena (Gottlieb, 2018; Gottlieb & Lombrozo, 2017). We know that people think that 
others’ minds are more biased and constrained, as well as less complex than theirs. And we 
also know that people believe that others’ inner states and dispositions are knowable whereas 
theirs are less accessible (Pronin, Kruger, Savtisky & Ross, 2001). This accessibility problem 
can also be true for science, thus leading people to think that the minds of others are more 
easily explained by science, whereas theirs are not so easily reducible to general principles 
that apply to everyone. 
Of most importance for the present proposal is the finding that people value 
introspection highly when trying to make sense of themselves, their judgments and behaviors 
(Pronin, 2009), whereas the same does not hold when thinking about other’s introspection (on 
the contrary, they think that introspection is a biasing factor).  
So, we hold highly positive beliefs about our introspection’s ability to assess why we 
did what we did and whether we were contaminated by bias or not, but (again) not when 
judging others’ introspections (Pronin et al., 2004). This asymmetry persists even after people 
are given access to the introspection of others (Pronin & Kugler, 2007), once again 
supporting their own personal “unbiased” beliefs over what is then dismissed (and possibly 
relevant) information. 
This asymmetry is referred to as the introspection illusion. The case is that, although 
people are able to give accurate information about the contents that might come about 
through introspection, the same cannot be said about their ability to accurately comprehend 
the processes generating those thoughts and guiding their behavior, since they are mostly 
inaccessible (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; a finding discussed and revised by e.g., Johansson, 
Hall, Sikström & Olsson, 2005; Petitmengin, Remillieux, Cahour & Carter-Thomas, 2013; 
Smith & Miller, 1978).  
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Nevertheless, people still hold their own introspection as very capable and as of great 
importance if they want to get closer to understanding what they really are and the intricacies 
of their complex self. The more a phenomenon is considered to be introspective the lesser it 
is seen as explainable by science (Gottlieb & Lombrozo, 2017). 
 
Our Research 
Given the research on what people believe to be the limits of scientific explanations 
and the very prevalent self-other differences, our goal with this study was simple: to explore 
self-other differences in people’s notions about the extent to which science can explain 
psychological phenomena.  
The prediction is that science is not seen as capable of explaining psychological 
phenomena to which people have exclusive introspective access and which people therefore 
think that they and only they can understand. Therefore, introspection should be a critical 
moderator in people’s intuitions concerning what science can explain about their minds 
(Gottlieb & Lombrozo, 2017; Gottlieb, 2018) and the minds of others. People believe that 
only they can understand what they think and how they feel, by looking inward and 
consulting their thoughts and feelings, as they are less accessible (Pronin et al., 2001).  
So, our hypothesis is that people reject the idea that science can explain how they 
think and what they feel, when the psychological phenomena in question are associated with 
a strong feeling of introspection. However, we suspect that people are more willing to accept 
that science can explain those very same phenomena when they take place in the mind of 
others. So, for highly introspective phenomena, people are likely to believe that the minds of 
others will be better explained by science than theirs. 
To test this hypothesis, Studies 1-2 test whether people believe that science can 
explain certain aspects of mental life in themselves versus other people. Moreover, those 
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studies provide correlational tests of several potential moderators of this self-other difference: 
introspection, uniqueness, control, and involvement. To anticipate the results, the predicted 
self-other difference emerged, and introspection moderated this difference. Having identified 
introspection as a moderator in the first studies, Study 3 offers direct experimental evidence 
for its effect on shaping beliefs about the reach of science for self-versus-others.        
   
Experiment 1 
Method 
 For all three studies, all measures, manipulations, and exclusions are disclosed, as 
well as the method of determining the final sample size, and the data were not analyzed 
before collection was completed.  
This research project was approved by the ethics board of the Scientific Council of the 
Psychology Department of the University of Lisbon. 
 Participants. 
The sample size was not pre-determined. Rather, participants responded voluntarily to 
a request sent out to a mailing list from a large European university. The number of valid 
responses was 276 (64% female, M age = 28.67, SD = 12.75).  
Design, procedure and measures. 
 Participants were informed that the study was concerned with what people think of 
what science can and cannot explain about the way the mind works, and how people think 
and feel. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: In the self-first 
condition (n = 141), they were told that “This study is interested in what you think about what 
science can explain about your mind. You will read about different domains of life, and we 
want you to indicate to what extent you believe that science can explain the way you think, 
feel and behave for each of them”, and then they answered the first block of dependent 
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variables. The second block was similar to the first one, except that now participants were 
told: “At this stage, this study is interested in what you think about what science can explain 
about the mind of other people in general. You will read about different domains of life, and 
we want you to indicate to what extent you believe that science can explain the way other 
people think, feel and behave for each of them” (the dependent variables in this second block 
were similar to those in the first block). For the others-first condition (n = 135), the order of 
these instructions was reversed.  
In both blocks, participants rated (from 1 – not at all, to 9 –  totally) their level of 
belief in, and discomfort with, the possibility that science can explain each of seven different 
domains (i.e., two items – belief and discomfort – for seven domains, multiplied over two 
target blocks).  
Because each domain appeared twice (as there were two blocks), the way that it was 
presented differed slightly across blocks, so as to avoid a consistency bias in the way people 
answered for self vs. others. For instance, if in one block participants expressed their belief 
that science could explain how people fall in love, in the other block they were asked about 
whether can explain how people feel romantic feelings. The other six domains were: personal 
relations and social psychology (why people become friends with certain people / why people 
belong to certain groups); likes (why people like certain music / why people like certain 
books); judgment and decision-making (why people make certain decisions / why people 
make certain moral judgments); interpersonal feelings (why people feel 
empathy/compassion); politics (why people have certain political ideologies / why people 
vote for certain parties); spirituality and religion (why people are religious or not / how 
people experience spirituality). Although these seven domains were presented within-subjects 
twice, they were always presented in a random order within each block.  
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Afterwards, and for each domain, participants were asked to express their agreement 
(from 1 – not at all, to 9 –  totally) with the following statements, designed to assess potential 
moderators: 1) there were two items assessing introspection (e.g., only a person him or 
herself can understand how he/she falls in love and experiences romantic feelings; a person 
who is in love and experiencing romantic feelings can know what he/she is feeling through 
introspection); 2) two items assessing uniqueness and feeling special: (e.g., if science were 
able to explain the way in which a person falls in love and experiences romantic feelings, that 
would make the love and feelings of that person less special; … that would make that person 
less unique and more similar to others); 3) two items assessing control (e.g., if science were 
able to explain the way in which a person falls in love and experiences romantic feelings, this 
would mean that these things are out of his/her control; …that these things are pre-
determined and there is no free-will); and 4) two items assessing involvement (e.g., How 
important is for you to be in love and experience romantic feelings?; To what degree are 
being in love and experiencing romantic feelings fundamental things in your life?). 
Results 
 Analyses used linear mixed models controlling for the repeated effects of block (block 
1 vs. block 2) and domain. For random effects, we included intercepts for subject and domain 
to adjust for possible variation.  
The direct effect of target. 
Belief in science. Target (self vs. others in general), block (block 1 vs. block 2), target 
order (self-other vs. other-self) and block order (block 1-2 vs. block 2-1) were entered as 
fixed effects. Results showed a main effect of target (estimate = -0.15, SE = 0.04, t(1790.83) 
= -3.50, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.24; -0.07]). The effects of block, target order and block order 
were not significant (all ts < -1.15; all ps > .252). Simple pairwise comparisons revealed that 
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belief in science was lower for the self (M = 5.27, SE = 0.11) than for other people in general 
(M = 5.43, SE = 0.11). 
Discomfort with science. No direct effects of the independent variables emerged as 
significant for the second dependent variable: discomfort with science (all ts < -1.59, all ps > 
.111). 
Moderation by introspection. 
Belief in science. We entered target (self vs. others in general), block (block 1 vs. 
block 2), target order (self-other vs. other-self) and block order (block 1-2 vs. block 2-1) as 
fixed effects. We entered the dimension of introspection as the moderator, followed by the 
interaction term of target by introspection. The results yielded a main effect of target 
(estimate = -0.15, SE = 0.04, t(1786.71) = -3.50, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.24; -0.07]), qualified 
by a moderation effect of target by introspection (estimate = -0.10, SE = 0.04, t(1786.70) = -
2.19, p = .029, 95% CI [-0.18; -0.01]). No other main effects were significant (all ts < -1.23, 
all ps > .217).  
Decomposing this interaction effect, results show that when participants believed that 
a certain phenomenon was highly associated with introspection, the explanatory ability of 
science was thought to be lower for the self (M = 5.21, SE = 0.16) than for others (M = 5.46, 
SE = 0.16, F(1, 1786.71) = 16.30, p < .001); when that was not the case, the perceived 
explanatory ability of science did not differ for self (M = 5.33, SE = 0.16) and others (M = 
5.39, SE = 0.16, F < 1, p = .349). 
Discomfort with science. We repeated the previous analysis using discomfort as the 
dependent variable. The effect of introspection was significant (estimate = 0.77, SE = 0.11, 
t(289.69) = 7.14, p < .001, 95% CI [0.56; 0.98]), qualified by an interaction effect of target by 
introspection (estimate = -0.12, SE = 0.04, t(1738.24) = -3.19, p = .001, 95% CI [-0.20; -
0.05]; the other effects were not significant, ts < -1.58, ps > .114). 
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The interaction effect shows that when participants believed that a phenomenon was 
associated with introspection and could only be understood by oneself, they reported a lower 
level of discomfort with the notion that science can explain that phenomenon for the self (M 
= 3.42, SE = 0.15) as compared to others in general (M = 3.60, SE = 0.15, F(1, 1738.26) = 
11.41, p = .001). When a phenomenon was not highly associated with introspection, the 
reported discomfort was equivalent for self (M = 2.12, SE = 0.15) and others (M = 2.06, SE = 
0.15; F(1, 1738.24) = 1.26, p = .262).  
Moderation by uniqueness/special. 
 We repeated the same analysis using as a moderator the extent to which participants 
felt that if science could explain their psychology, this would make them less unique and 
special. 
Belief in science. The results showed a main effect of target (estimate = -0.15, SE = 
0.04, t(1786.62) = -3.49, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.24; -0.07]), a main effect of uniqueness 
(estimate = -0.41, SE = 0.11, t(295.25) = -3.79, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.62; -0.20]), both 
qualified by a marginal moderation effect of target by uniqueness (estimate = -0.08, SE = 
0.04, t(1786.60) = -1.87, p = .061, 95% CI [-0.17; 0.004]). No other main effects were 
significant (all ts < -1.31, all ps > .193).  
When decomposing this interaction effect, results show that when participants 
believed that scientifically explaining a phenomenon would make a person less unique and 
special, the perceived explanatory value of science was lower for the self (M = 4.79, SE = 
0.15) than for others in general (M = 5.02, SE = 0.15, F(1, 1786.62) = 14.53, p < .001). When 
participants did not believe that explaining a phenomenon would undermine one’s uniqueness 
or feeling special, there were no differences in belief in science for self (M = 5.77, SE = 0.15) 
versus others (M = 5.84, SE = 0.15, F(1, 1786.60) = 1.33, p = .249). 
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Discomfort with science. When discomfort was the dependent variable, there was a 
main effect of uniqueness (estimate = 1.02, SE = 0.10, t(292.20) = 10.08, p < .001, 95% CI 
[0.82; 1.22]), qualified by an interaction effect of target by uniqueness (estimate = -0.12, SE 
= 0.04, t(1740.46) = -3.05, p = .002, 95% CI [-0.19; -0.04]). The remaining effects were not 
significant, all ts < -1.57, all ps > .116. 
The interaction effect shows that when participants believed that if science could 
explain a certain phenomenon about someone that make that someone less unique and 
special, they reported less discomfort with the explanatory power of science for the self (M = 
3.67, SE = 0.14) when compared to others in general (M = 3.85, SE = 0.14, F(1, 1740.48) = 
10.75, p = .001). When participants did not think that a scientific explanation would 
compromise uniqueness or feeling special, discomfort with science did not differ for self (M 
= 1.86, SE = 0.14) versus others (M = 1.80, SE = 0.14; F(1, 1740.46) = 1.06, p = .304). 
Moderation by control. 
 We repeated the same analyses using control as moderator. 
Belief in science. There was a main effect of target (estimate = -0.15, SE = 0.04, 
t(1787.81) = -3.49, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.24; -0.07]), such that science was perceived as less 
capable of explaining the self than other people in general. No other main effects or 
interaction effect were significant (all ts < -1.38, all ps > .168).  
Discomfort with science. There was a main effect of control (estimate = 0.91, SE = 
0.10, t(290.77) = 8.67, p < .001, 95% CI [0.70; 1.12]), qualified by an interaction of target by 
control (estimate = -0.14, SE = 0.04, t(1736.94) = -3.64, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.22; -0.07]; the 
remaining effects were not significant, all ts < -1.57, all ps > .117). 
Breaking down the interaction, when participants believed that if science could 
explain a phenomenon this would imply less control and free will, they reported less 
discomfort with the possibility of a scientific explanation about the self (M = 3.54, SE = 0.15) 
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than about others (M = 3.74, SE = 0.15, F(1, 1736.96) = 13.66, p < .001). When participants 
did not think that a scientific explanation would imply less control, they did not differ in their 
discomfort with the idea of science explaining themselves (M = 2.00, SE = 0.15) or others (M 
= 1.92, SE = 0.15; F(1, 1736.94) = 2.10, p = .147). 
Moderation by involvement. 
Finally, we repeated these analyses testing involvement as a moderator. 
Belief in science. The only significant main effect was the effect of target (estimate = 
-0.15, SE = 0.04, t(1789.45) = -3.49, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.24; -0.07]), such that science was 
again seen as better able to explain other people than oneself. All other effects were not 
significant, all ts < -1.14, all ps > .253. 
Discomfort with science. There was a main effect of involvement (estimate = 0.31, 
SE = 0.04, t(1733.54) = 2.75, p = .006, 95% CI [0.09; 0.54]), such that the idea of science 
explaining a certain psychological phenomenon was more uncomfortable the more involved 
people were with that phenomena, but no other effects were significant (all ts < -1.59, all ps > 
.113). 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 were at best mixed and far from conclusive. On the one hand, 
the results with the first dependent variable (belief in science) are as predicted: in general, 
people find it easier to believe that science can explain the psychology of other people than 
their own, and this in part seems to relate to some of the moderators that were explored, such 
as associating a certain phenomenon with introspection, or thinking that scientific 
explanations make a person feel less unique and special. However, the results with the other 
dependent variable (discomfort with science) sometimes went in the opposite direction. A 
posteriori, one can think of reasons for this incongruity, such as the possibility that one is not 
uncomfortable with the idea that science can explain something about oneself precisely 
15 
 
because one does not believe that it can do so. Still, this explanation is tentative at best, and 
these results call for further investigation. The following studies seek to provide better tests 
of the predictions, using much fewer items (Study 1 was quite long and possibly tiresome and 
confusing in its many measures) and simpler instructions.  
 
Experiment 2 
Method  
Participants. 
 We used G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to conduct a power 
analysis based on fixed effects (main and interaction effects) for F-tests. Accordingly, and in 
order to capture a medium-to-large effect (f = 0.30), with α = .05, power = .80, for two 
different groups, the required sample size was 90 participants. To have a sample robust to 
attrition, we recruited a few additional participants: 100 participants, from which we excluded 
four who reported having participated in Experiment 1. Thus, our final sample size was 96 
(M age = 35.86, SD = 13.34; 79% female), recruited in exchange for course credit. 
Design, procedure and measures. 
 Target (self vs. other) was manipulated between-subjects. Participants were randomly 
allocated to one of the two target conditions (self, n = 49; other, n = 47), where they were 
specifically given instructions to imagine a scenario for the self vs. someone else. Participants 
read the following:  
“This study is about the beliefs that people hold about how science can explain 
people’s behavior, thoughts, and feelings. Imagine that a team of scientists made an 
exhaustive study about how you/someone else think. This is the most exhaustive 
study ever done about how someone’s mind works. The study involves an exhaustive 
amount of tests, including techniques of brain imaging (mapping the activated areas 
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of the brain when you/someone else think(s)), physiological measures (heart rate, skin 
conductance, etc.), clinical interviews and psychometric tests. 
At the end of the study, these scientists are confident that they can fully understand 
the way how you/someone else think(s). Specifically, they claim to be able to explain 
how you/someone else feel(s) and think(s) about several life domains: for example, 
the romantic choices that you/the other person make(s) and how you/the other 
person fall(s) in love and feel(s) love; why you/the other person have(has) the friends 
you/(s)he have(has) and belong(s) to certain groups; why you/the other person like(s) 
certain music and certain books; how you/another person feel(s) empathy and 
compassion for others in suffering; and why you/the other person are(is) or are(is) 
not religious and how you/(s)he experience(s) spirituality. Additionally, these 
scientists claim that, based on these results, it is possible to predict what you/someone 
else are(is) going to do, think and feel in the future. For example, based on these 
results, it is possible to predict the type of person with whom you/the other person 
are(is) going to fall in love.” 
Afterwards participants completed three items assessing their belief in the explanatory 
power of science, and then three other items assessing potential moderators (presented in 
random order). 
Dependent variable. 
The perceived explanatory power of science was measured using three items: “To 
what extent do you believe the conclusions of this study?”; “To what extent do you believe 
that this is possible, that is, that a scientific study is able to fully understand how 
you/someone else think(s)?”; “Even if you believe that science is still not able to fully 
understand how you/someone else think(s) currently, do you believe that this will be possible 
17 
 
one day?”. Responses were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (totally). Aggregating the 
3 items, α = .87. 
Potential moderators. 
Then participants read: “Regardless of whether you believe in this or not, we now ask 
you to think about what it would mean if this was possible, that is, admitting that it was 
possible. If a scientific study were able to fully understand how you/another person think(s), 
what would be the implications of such a study?” Next, they rated their agreement with each 
of the following statements, from 1 (totally disagree) to 9 (totally agree). 
Control. “If this were possible, it would mean that you are/another person is not truly 
in control of what you/(s)he think(s) and do(es), that is, that you/another person are(is) not 
truly responsible for your(her/his) thoughts and feelings and that these things are pre-
determined”. 
Special. “If this were possible, it would mean that there is nothing special about how 
you/another person think(s) and feel(s), and that all your(her/his) thoughts and feelings are 
merely the result of biological mechanisms operating in the brain”. 
Introspection. “Only you/another person can truly understand how you/(s)he think(s) 
and feel(s); someone else on the outside can try to understand, but (s)he will never be able to 
truly know how you/(s)he think(s) and feel(s)”. 
Results 
Moderation by introspection.  
We conducted a univariate ANOVA, entering explanatory power of science as the 
dependent variable, target as the factor, introspection as the moderator, and the respective 
interaction term. Results yielded a significant interaction effect of target by introspection, 
F(1, 96) = 5.54, p = .021, ηp2 = .06. The main effects of target and introspection were not 
significant (Fs < 1, ps > .496, ηp2s < .005). 
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Decomposing the interaction effect, simple pairwise comparisons show that when 
introspection was rated more highly (+ 1 SD) participants believed that science had less 
explanatory power for the self (M = 5.14, SE = 0.37) than for another person (M = 6.22, SE = 
0.34, F(1, 92) = 4.70, p = .033, ηp2 = .05). When introspection was rated lower (- 1 SD) 
participants did not differ in their beliefs about science for self (M = 6.15, SE = 0.32) vs. 
others (M = 5.55, SE = 0.39, F(1, 92) = 1.40, p = .240, ηp2 = .02). 
Moderation by control and feeling special.  
We repeated the same analyses for each of the other two potential moderators, but the 
resulting effects were not significant (Fs < 1, ps > .356, ηp2s < .009). 
Discussion 
Summing up what we found so far, the only consistent result across the two previous 
studies is the moderating effect of introspection in the self-other difference in beliefs about 
science. Study 3 narrows down on introspection and provides a more direct, experimental test 
of its effect on thinking about science for oneself versus others.     
 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. 
We used again G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) to conduct a power analysis to 
determine the sample size needed to detect an effect using only within-subjects’ factors. 
Based on the interaction effect of interest in Experiment 2, with f = 0.22, α = .05, and power 
= .80, the required sample size was 43. We recruited 45 participants (M age = 24.82, SD = 
5.13; 51% female) in the Prolific Academic platform.  
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Design, procedure and measures. 
Introspection was manipulated within-subjects. Specifically, participants were asked 
to consider ten different mental phenomena, which were selected from Gottlieb and 
Lombrozo (2017) as scoring high or low in phenomenological introspection (we adapted 
items from among the highest- or lowest-ranking introspection scores averaging across 
Gottlieb & Lombrozo’s Studies 2a and 3a-b; in these studies, items were rated on a scale 
from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree and the average across studies will be 
presented next following each item). The high-introspection phenomena were: 1) Feeling 
compassion for those in suffering, M = 5.67; 2) The love one feels for one’s parents, siblings 
or children (adapted), M = 5.76; 3) The ability to appreciate a beautiful landscape, M = 5.5; 4) 
Feelings of spirituality M = 5.49; and 5) Falling in love, M = 5.64. The low-introspection 
phenomena were: 1) Being better or worse at recognizing people (adapted), M = 3.56; 2) 
Making certain mathematical errors, M = 4.36; 3) The ability to perceive depth and calculate 
distance (adapted), M = 4.37; 4) Being better or worse at reading a map (adapted), M = 4.53; 
and 5) How people combine perception and motricity to reach objects (adapted), M = 4.72. 
High- and low-introspective phenomena were rated above and below, respectively, the 
midpoint of the scale. 
Participants were given the following instructions: “Imagine that a team of scientists 
did a study to try to understand how people e.g., feel compassion for those in suffering.” 
Next, participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with three sentences (from 1 
= totally disagree, to 9 = totally agree):1) “Although this study would be able to explain how 
other people in general e.g., feel compassion for those in suffering, it would not be able to 
explain how it happens with me”; 2) “The results of this study would help to understand how 
others e.g., feel compassion for those in suffering, but they would never really be able to get 
to the bottom of how I feel and think about it”; and 3) “Even though I believe that scientific 
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studies can make sense of how some people e.g., feel compassion for those in suffering, I 
doubt that they could explain how I truly think and feel about it”. To be consistent with 
Experiments 1-2, we reverse-scored the three items so that higher values mean higher 
perceived explanatory power of science for the self. 
Each of the ten events was randomly presented to participants, and each of them was 
followed by these three items.  
Results 
We conducted a Linear Mixed Model analysis, controlling for the repeated effects of 
event and introspection. Additionally, for random effects we included the intercept for subject 
to adjust for possible variation. Results revealed a main effect of introspection on the 
explanatory power of science, b = 1.30, SE = 0.14, t(365.04) = 9.38, p < .001, 95% CI [1.03; 
1.57]. When considering high-introspection events participants judged that science had a 
lower explanatory power for self vs. others (M = 4.98, SE = 0.20) than when considering low-
introspection events (M = 6.28, SE = 0.19). 
 
General Discussion 
These studies suggest that people have different beliefs regarding what science can 
explain about the way they think versus the way other people think. Study 1 showed that, in 
general, people see science as better able to explain the psychology of other people than their 
own, and that this is particularly the case when a certain psychological phenomenon is highly 
associated with introspection (though there were other significant moderators in this study, 
and results were not consistent across dependent variables).  
Study 2 replicated this interaction, whereby science is seen as having a greater 
explanatory power for other people than for oneself, and that this is particularly the case 
when introspection is involved. Whereas Studies 1-2 provided correlational evidence, Study 3 
21 
 
provided an experimental test of the role of introspection in self-other differences in thinking 
about science and what it can explain. The results gave clear support to those of the previous 
studies: For highly introspective phenomena people believe that science is better at making 
sense of others than of themselves, whereas this self-other difference disappears when 
introspection is not thought to be involved.  
There are, of course, limitations to these studies. In Study 3, for example, one could 
argue that the design is quite simple and that the meaning of participants’ answers is not 
readily clear. To illustrate, when answering “Although this study would be able to explain 
how other people in general [low-introspective phenomenon], it would not be able to explain 
how it happens with me”, disagreeing could mean either that one believes that science 
explains oneself better than others, or that science explains both equally well (or poorly). But 
we have no reason to believe the former, as our other two studies as well as those of others 
(e.g., Pronin, Kruger, Savtisky & Ross, 2001; Schroeder, Waytz, & Epley, 2017; Waytz, 
Schroeder & Epley, 2014) suggest that that is not a likely hypothesis.  
Moreover, and still concerning Study 3, we understand that the qualitative meaning of 
the average answer for highly introspective phenomena to mean neither agreeing nor 
disagreeing. Thus, people on average are not saying that others are better explained than 
themselves. It is our belief that the first two studies can offer some arguments in this regard, 
enabling us to disentangle the possible meaning of this lack of position-taking. Why would 
people not disagree (for highly introspective phenomena) with the very same sentences that 
they had no trouble disagreeing with when asked for low introspective phenomena? It is our 
suggestion that there is something very different about those phenomena, which makes 
oneself less explainable that others. Science seems to be limited not so much by the 
complexity of phenomena but rather by the very first-person perspective that one must have 
to understand high introspective phenomena fully. This is a great challenge for science, given 
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that scientific methodology implies in its very concept a third-person perspective. So, people 
are not exactly agreeing with the items, but they do not disagree because, of all the three 
possible ways their answer could go (agree, disagree, or neither), others being better 
explained than them is something they could not disagree with. Future studies might help to 
further clarify this point by presenting a forced-choice paradigm, where people either agree or 
disagree, thus avoiding the neither-kind of answer, and possibly accounting for how much 
time they take to answer or how confident they feel about their choice. 
The reason why people seemingly believe to be less explainable when it comes to 
highly introspective phenomena deserves further investigation as well. It could be the case 
that the effects found in the present study are a consequence of people perceiving themselves 
as more complex than others (Schroeder et al., 2017; Waytz et al., 2014). Furthermore, the 
results of Pronin and colleagues (2001) on the illusion of asymmetric insight suggest that 
people might be considering observable behavior (e.g., interpersonal revelations) as a better 
indicator of what others might be, contrasting with private thoughts and feelings as better 
indicators of what themselves might be. This would add that piece of “unexplainable” 
possibly guiding the self-other difference effect that we have been describing. People seem to 
believe that those very thoughts and feelings are part of what best describes their true nature 
(Markus, 1983) and these types of bias, as aforementioned, are consistently found throughout 
research on self-other differences (e.g., Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Dunning et al., 2004; 
Williams & Gilovich, 2008). 
Relatedly, it is perhaps relevant to discuss here the actor–observer hypothesis (Jones 
& Nisbett, 1972). This hypothesis states that “people tend to explain their own behavior with 
situation causes and other people’s behavior with person causes” (Malle, 2006, p. 895). The 
fact that situational causes might be what better explains our behavior certainly makes a case 
for the lesser predictability quality of our past and future (Pronin and Kugler, 2010). 
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Situations being so different from one another might be what makes our private thoughts and 
feelings so mysterious and inaccessible (Pronin et al., 2001), as our reactions to very specific 
and unpredictable situations might be as specific and unpredictable as those. Still, this 
relation is not quite clear considering that this asymmetry is found for negative events, but the 
opposite is true for positive events (Malle, 2006). 
What could be the case is that, as an actor, one’s focus of attention is on one’s private 
knowledge of desires and intentions in relation to the situational features that one must 
account for. Whilst the observer, having no access to those private clues, can mostly focus on 
the observable behavior of the actor (as explained in Pronin, Gilovich & Ross, 2004). So, 
when judging how explainable one is compared to others, it could be that, non-intently, one 
does not account for everything else other than the observable behaviors of others when 
making assumptions about their explicability. The focus of attention is simply shifting 
depending on actor-observer perspective. 
Despite this being a candidate account for what is happening, it does not however 
solve the problem as to why it is happening. Supposedly, people learn about others being as 
much mental beings as they are from a very early age (see e.g., Astington, 1993). The “theory 
of mind” hypothesis posits that we understand others as having their own mental states, 
thoughts, wants, motives and feelings (even chimpanzees seem to have some understanding 
of this; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). So, it is not quite clear what exactly makes people 
forget this fact, or to consider their own mental states as more complex than those of others. 
In this regard, further work could and should attempt to better understand the role of 
motivated and non-motivated biases and the degree of their influence in the kind of effects 
that we have been describing. There is a long debate about the role of each kind of bias (e.g. 
Brown, 2012; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Sherman & Sherman, 1999). Chambers and 
Windschitl cleverly point out that results many times regarded as supporting a motivated 
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reasoning bias could very well be non-motivated (cognitive). To put it simply, as the authors 
explain, motivational accounts suggest that the biases that we so often observe in comparative 
judgments are in the service of some self-relevant goal or motive. On the other hand, non-
motivated accounts consider that cognitive mechanisms and the characteristics of the task 
(e.g., such as the inherent actor-observer perspective that we mentioned before) are sufficient 
for the biases to occur. Thus, non-motivated accounts do not assume that comparative biases 
are consequences of there being a purpose behind people’s answers, only that the answers 
themselves are a consequence of cognitive mechanisms and the aspects of the task itself. The 
former posits there being an unconscious or conscious intent, the latter does not suppose there 
being intent at all. 
Arguably, neither can account for everything on their own, nor is it out of the 
possibilities that both might serve a role in self-other differences. Chambers and Windschitl 
(2004) conclude that “there is only limited evidence that proximal motivational concerns 
(feeling bad, anxious, threatened within a particular setting) trigger motivationally biased 
responding in comparative judgments. Whether more distal motivational concerns are 
influential in comparative biases might be another matter” (p. 817). 
Motivation does not seem to possibly manifest itself and reach its goals without 
cognition, and cognition without motivation sounds very much like a machine working 
without purpose, objectives or goals, further implying that there can be potential motivations 
behind cognitive function, as well as “cognitions” giving rise to motives. 
Amongst all the possible interactions between motivation and cognition, the problem 
presents itself a lot like a chicken-or-egg kind of question. Only here, just like the deadly-
living or living-dead cat of Schrödinger, both forms of biases are as much the egg as they are 
the chicken. Both motivational accounts and non-motivated accounts have served each other 
over time in research, both informing the other’s considerations. It is no longer time for 
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confrontation over each one is in fact the only one. Making this, like Sherman and Sherman 
(1999) put it, not an “unsolvable” debate but rather a debate not so useful to solve. The 
authors suggest moving on from this and working hard on “figuring out exactly when, why, 
and how motives and cognitions interact” (p. 68). 
Moreover, together with this, another suggestion is to better understand what lies 
beyond the broad scope of the introspective process that we base our research upon. Not all 
the information that one might come about through the process of introspection is of the same 
nature. It is also not clear that each part of the whole sum of the information holds the same 
value compared to the remaining pieces. During the process of introspection, some thoughts, 
feelings and memories could be more important than others to explain and understand 
different phenomena. Do we expect love to be comparable in its extent to be explained with 
the ability to appreciate a beautiful landscape? Do we expect them to mean the same to 
someone’s personal narrative and personal identity? We understand different phenomena to 
be perceived differently in their scientific explicability, but are they fully unexplainable, or 
does the extent to which they are unexplainable depend on the quality and quantity of said 
unexplainable parts? 
It is possible for introspection to vary from a descriptive end of a continuum to a more 
analytic end (Ellis, 1991). Meaning, from where individuals describe their thoughts and 
feelings (descriptive end) to where they examine what they felt and why they felt it (analytic 
end). Maybe people believe that their inner self is simply indescribable (descriptive 
limitations). Maybe their expectations of what science might say about the reasons they feel 
what they feel do not match the reasons they have to feel what they feel (analytic limitations). 
Maybe some phenomena draw the line on these limitations differently than others.  
In future research, wording the questions about each phenomenon in different ways 
might help to further solve this problem. The wording of questions has shown to influence 
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people’s answers (e.g., Holleman, 1999; Loftus & Zanni, 1975; Petrinovich & Neill, 1996), 
and thus it may be possible to guide information processing into different parts of the same 
phenomenon by wording questions differently (e.g., how, why, or what). Maybe for some 
phenomena people accept science to be able to explain what the phenomenon is, but not 
exactly why it is what it is. An anecdotal example of this could be the problem of the 
meaning of life, that is, we may accept for science know what is to be alive, how are we 
alive, but maybe not so much why are we alive. 
Thus, work should be done in figuring out exactly why and what are the perceived 
insufficiencies of science, now that we know that it is in fact perceived as such, as well as in 
understanding more clearly the contents emerging from the introspective process, so that we 
can better define and characterize introspection (e.g., Boring, 1953). 
The implications of these results include the following: First, the skepticism 
concerning what science can explain about oneself should work as a barrier for people to 
accept certain treatments and follow certain science-based recommendations for themselves. 
Moreover, the double standard that people have for the limits of science for themselves vs. 
others should also contribute to a choice-advice asymmetry, whereby the choices that people 
make for themselves differ from the choices that they advise others to make (Atanasov, 2015; 
Dana & Cain, 2015). This is particularly relevant considering that decision-making in 
domains such as health can be delegated to surrogates (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Fagerlin, 
Ditto, Danks & Houts, 2001). Thus, people may suggest treatments and interventions for 
others that they would not choose for themselves (Schroeder et al., 2017).  
Moreover, if science does not understand why people dismiss its findings, how can it 
learn about communicating them better? What happens one day, beholding an urgent 
problem, if the good solution science has to offer is simply thrown aside in favor of the 
intuitions of those in power making decisions? This is particularly a problem for Psychology, 
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since people have shown to find the same scientific ideas to be better or worse depending on 
their scientific source (e.g., neuroscience vs. psychology; Fernandez-Duque, 2017; Weisberg, 
Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray, 2008), suggesting a differentiated resistance to these 
scientific ideas (for a developmental account of this see Bloom, & Weisberg, 2007) and a 
possible resistance to explanations about the mind and the endeavors of the heart compared to 
explanations about the physical body.  
People have been “awarded” for trying to do research on things such as love, the so 
called “unneeded” research (see Hatfield, 2006; for an historical anecdote on this), which, 
considering what we have been discussing, does not seem as strange as one might have 
thought when learning about this story for the first time. 
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